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We use a disciplined, data-driven approach to analyzing the effect that political connection has on possible excessive 
profits of DoD contractors. Such connections could serve to influence government acquisition and lead to non-ideal 
government cost outcomes. Our research follows the methodology of Wang (2014) in conducting biographical 
analysis of corporate governors and comparative analysis of ROA against non-defense firms, controlled for size and 
industry SIC. This research seeks to identify whether the political connections of Top 100 Defense Contractor 
leadership over 10-year period affect government cost outcomes. 
Do Corporate Officers’ Political Connection 
Affect DoD Contractor Profitability?  
A 10-year, data-driven analysis of US public firms.
Results
• DoD contractors earn 0.9% additional profit above non-
defense peers, which is statistically significant in aggregate –
and equates to $11.4 billion.
• Political connection is generally increasing over time.
• Dual-appointed CEO/Chairmen earn 1.1% additional ROA 
above non-defense comps, though their firms derive 9.5% 
less of their revenue from defense.
Recommendations
% of CEO and Director Political Connection 
2009-2018
Methods
• Evaluated biographical data of 330 CEO0firm-years  
and 3,470 director-firm-years compiled from 
Compustat against two-tier evaluative criteria.
• Examine duality/independence as measure of 
corporate governance
• Conducted comparative analysis against non-DoD 
firms of ROA controlled for size and industry SIC to 
determine profit difference (sample ROA - control 
ROA = ROA difference)
• Multivariate regressive analysis to evaluate 
relationships
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Research Summary
• Mature framework was the start, additional data is the 
next step
• Integrate social connection research into this model.
• Individually evaluate the Aerospace Industrial 
Association’s relationship to excessive profits.
• Little research on excessive profit in DoD acquisition, 
nothing since 2008.
• Stratified, refined definition of political connection
‒ Political Heavyweight: acknowledges connection 
inherent to presidential appointment, deputy 
directors of major government agencies, political 
action committee leadership roles
‒ Political Connection:  includes service on other 
nationally recognized boards, by-name Treasury-
requested takeover of troubled firm, senior level 
consulting roles
• Political Connection is not the sole explanatory variable 
for excess profit but looks to be part of it.
• Marginally significant findings of political heavyweight 
CEOs earning 1.84% excessive profit, 1% greater than 
firms with non-politically heavy connected CEOs.Multivariate Regression Findings
• We were limited by our available tools – this was done 
in Excel.  While we dabbled in Machine Learning, 
additional data sets would make this an excellent 
candidate for ML.
